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Abstract 
Many IT enabled networks have attained a large user base induced by strong network effects, 
which are thought to create an economic moat by increasing switching costs, thus offering 
protection against new entrants. The underlying assumption behind this result is that users 
completely adopt one network at any given time. Is the incumbency protection power of the 
moat as strong in multi-homing when users co-exist on multiple networks and can 
incrementally adopt a new entrant? We develop a multi-period analytical model of 
endogenous adoption decisions in a setting where a new network arrives with a superior 
capability, and where users have a resource constraint and derive value from technological 
capability as well as network effects. We demonstrate that the moat created by network effects 
for the case of incremental adoption is weaker than that in the case of complete adoption. Thus 
the protection power of network effects and the resulting competitive intensity may be 
overrated and underplayed respectively in many modern technology settings.  
 
Keywords:  Network effects, switching cost, incumbency protection, new entry, multi-homing,  
adoption dynamics  
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1. Introduction 
 
Many IT-enabled networks like Facebook, LinkedIn and Twitter have grown large by building strong network 
effects (Stross 2010). Such positive externalities increase switching costs (Farrell, Shapiro 1988; Klemperer 
1987), and are believed to create an economic moat1 that protects incumbents against new entrants, thereby 
lowering the intensity of competition. The network effects literature would suggest that due to large installed 
user bases, early online social networks such as MySpace and Orkut would witness minimal migration of their 
users to late entrants like Facebook. Yet it is well documented that most adopters of early social media 
significantly reduced the time spent on incumbent networks like MySpace to embrace newer networks like 
Facebook, even though the latter did not arrive with revolutionary capabilities or features2. Figure 1 shows that 
during 2007-09, the average time spent on MySpace dropped from thirty to ten minutes, while that spent on 
Facebook increased steadily. By January 2011, the average time on MySpace had declined to just five minutes, 
while that on Facebook increased to thirty four minutes (Source: www.alexa.com). If network effects helped 
MySpace grow in the first place, how can we explain the rapid decline in MySpace activity and a corresponding 
increase on Facebook? In other words, did network effects not offer sufficient protection to the incumbent?  
 
 
 
 
Figure1: Time spent on MySpace and Facebook (www.compete.com) 
A closer scrutiny of the early network effects literature (e.g., Katz and Shapiro, 1985, 1994) reveals that the key 
results involving incumbency protection implicitly assume that a user can be a member of only one network at a 
point in time. For example, in the case of Beta and VHS standards battle or QWERTY and DVORAK keyboard 
adoption (Liebowitz and Margolis, 1994), users are assumed to completely adopt only one of the standards. 
Traditionally, the focus of the network effects literature has been on such binary adoption decisions or single 
homing (SH) (Rochet and Tirole, 2003). However, in many instances today, users do not have to choose one 
network or technology over another. Rather, they may choose to co-adopt multiple networks simultaneously, 
which is referred to as multi-homing (MH) (Rochet and Tirole, 2003, Gabszewicz and Wauthy, 2004). For 
example, the Super Audio Compact Disc (SACD) and Digital Versatile Disc Audio (DVD-A) are competing 
formats for multi-channel audio. In spite of predictions of a standards war driving out one format (e.g., Shapiro 
and Varian 1998), both continue to co-exist a decade after their introduction. Such co-adoption is made possible 
by the availability of universal players, which allow consumers to buy their favorite albums on DVD-A or SACD 
based on availability, and rely on CD or MP3 for other albums (Mock 2004). With switching costs due to format 
differences being reduced, consumers are able to choose multiple formats simultaneously.  
 
However, as shown in Table 1, the extant literature on MH (e.g., Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Gabszewicz and 
Wauthy, 2004; Armstrong and Wright, 2005; Parker and Van Alstyne 2005; Armstrong, 2006; Doganoglu and 
Wright, 2006; Eisenmann et al. 2006) does not consider the extent and dynamics of adoption of multiple 
platforms or networks through the allocation of limited resources. For example, in Gabszewicz and Wauthy 
(2004), a visitor can buy passes to more than one exhibition center, while an exhibitor can choose to display in 
multiple exhibition centers. That is, either single homing (i.e., choosing one center to visit and/or display 
                                                          
1 “In business, I look for economic castles protected by unbreachable moats.” -Warren Buffett 
2 http://www.informationweek.com/news/internet/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=200000822 
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products) or the complete adoption of multi-homing (i.e., choosing multiple centers) is considered. The model 
does not investigate the case where a visitor and an exhibitor may have a time and budget constraint respectively, 
which may lead to a division of resources and hence the extent of adoption of multiple exhibition centers.   
   
In many multi-homing scenarios such as social networks or traditional CD versus DVD-A/SACD, users or 
adopters have a limited amount of resources such as time and money which can be allocated toward the adoption 
of networks, products or platforms. That is, users have a choice of the amount of resource to allocate to a 
platform (and hence the extent of adoption), which can vary from period to period in a temporal model. Our key 
research question involves whether network effects offer strong protection to incumbents in MH settings where 
users can incrementally adopt a new network by dividing limited resources between the incumbent and a new 
entrant, and then gradually increase the resource(s) allocated to the new entrant under certain conditions. The 
dynamics of migration in such cases remain an open question in the literature. For example, how large a 
technological capability does the new entrant need to enter the market? Should it initially target users with high 
affinity to technological capability or network effects? How long can the incumbent afford to wait before 
improving its capabilities in order to maintain its market share in the presence of a new entrant with superior 
capabilities?  
 
Table 1: Extant literature on multi-homing 
 
Study Focus 
Rochet and 
Tirole (2003) 
Analyzes the role of governance structure on pricing in the presence of multi-homing, 
where users choose multiple platforms completely. 
Gabszewicz and 
Wauthy (2004) 
Analyzes two-sided markets and price competition in the presence of multi-homing. 
Complete adoption is assumed, e.g., a visitor can buy passes to two exhibition centers, 
while an exhibitor can also exhibit in both centers.  
Armstrong and 
Wright (2005) 
Analyzes pricing dynamics of two sided markets in the presence of multi-homing and 
externalities. Different levels of adoption for multiple platforms are not considered.  
Parker and Van 
Alstyne (2005) 
Analyzes when a firm can offer a free good in two-sided markets. The study does not focus 
on the extent of adoption in a multi-homing context.  
Armstrong 
(2006) 
Analyzes the equilibrium prices to be paid by platform users in the presence of cross group 
externalities in two sided markets. There is no discussion about the extent or timing of 
adoption of multiple platforms. 
Doganoglu and 
Wright (2006) 
Analyzes the effect of compatibility on private and social incentives in multi-homing, 
which involves complete adoption of multiple platforms.  
Eisenmann et 
al. (2006) 
Analyzes strategies for two-sided markets, and suggests that “winner-take-all” scenarios 
are possible when multi-homing costs are high for users along with strong network effects. 
The study does not focus specifically on the dynamics of incremental adoption of multiple 
networks.   
                   
A user derives benefits from the capability of a network or technology, and from network effects (Katz and 
Shapiro, 1985; Liebowitz and Margolis, 1999). Network capability may be attributed to proprietary technology, 
functionality, control over information/privacy, interface, customizability, applications, etc. Network effect is the 
benefit that each user of a good or service realizes as more people use the same good or service. For instance, 
both Skype and Gtalk have instant messaging and voice-over-IP features, though Skype is believed to be superior 
in voice quality and PC-to-phone calls. However, Google‟s Gtalk is integrated with Gmail, Google Docs and other 
applications, thus enabling a user to add new contacts from her mailing list and manage all interactions through 
email or chat. Thus a user may choose Skype for superior voice quality and PC-to-phone calls, but also use Gtalk 
to interact with her contacts already using the latter option.  
We demonstrate through a multi-period analytical model that in the MH case where a user coexists on the 
incumbent and the new entrant networks by dividing her total time spent on networking, even a marginally 
superior technological capability of the new network will start a slow bleeding of the incumbent network, thus 
triggering a decline in the total time spent on the incumbent. Eventually, the network effects on the new entrant 
may become strong at the cost of that in the incumbent network. This may create an avalanche, whereby the 
remaining users on the incumbent network allocate increasing amounts of time to the new network, leading to a 
major shrinkage of time spent on the former. By contrast, in the SH case considered in the early network effects 
literature, a quantum leap in capability is necessary to make users migrate to the new network. Thus the 
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incumbent may be more vulnerable than previously considered on the basis of the extant literature. Further, the 
highest technological capability required to cause migration in a SH network must be provided before that in the 
case of MH. Therefore, in the latter setting, the new entrant does not have to deliver the highest required 
capability upfront; since the required capability increases gradually for MH, the new entrant has more time 
relative to SH to improve its technology to attract users. Since the extant MH literature has not focused on partial 
and incremental adoption of multiple platforms or networks, the required capability of the new entrant and the 
dynamics of the migration process have received scant attention.     
The key contribution of our study is to demonstrate that the incumbency protection power of network effects 
may be overrated or hyped in today‟s world where other types of switching costs have been lowered to enable co-
adoption of multiple technologies or networks. Our results underscore an increase in competitive intensity where 
a new entrant can arrive with only a marginally superior capability and improve its offering over time to breach 
the incumbent‟s moat created by network effects. Our work also contributes to the diffusion literature by treating 
migration or diffusion across networks as an endogenous and incremental choice by users rather than an 
exogenously specified model parameter. To the best of our knowledge, this is also the first attempt in the multi-
homing literature to model and analyze the temporal dynamics of incremental adoption of multiple platforms.   
 
2. Past Research 
 
The „Information Economy‟ has traditionally been believed to be propelled by strong network effects (Shapiro 
and Varian 1998; Katz and Shapiro 1985; Katz and Shapiro 1994). For example, a Facebook user who uses the 
network to keep in touch and/or play multi-player games like Farmville with friends would value the network 
more as more of her friends join the network. It is believed that such positive externalities would make a strong 
network stronger and a weak network weaker (Shapiro and Varian 1998). However, this result is based on the 
fact that the incumbent network induces a large switching cost for users through network effects, thus shielding 
the incumbent from a new entrant with superior capabilities. In the context of online social networks as with 
many other technologies, there is no direct membership cost, while the learning curve is minimal owing to 
similarity in the basic functionality and usability across networks. Thus, network effects are the primary source 
of switching cost in online social networks. In spite of the presence of network effects, history shows that new 
technology products and services have been launched successfully in competitive markets and that market 
segments have been penetrated into and captured. This is often made possible due to innovation in terms of 
revolutionary technology (e.g., the Apple iPhone), path breaking business models (e.g., Apple iTunes) or an 
evolutionary strategy, whereby the new player enters the market by being compatible with the incumbent. The 
revolutionary strategy is marked by a large improvement or “discontinuity” in technological capability, whereas 
the evolutionary strategy follows a smoother transition (Shapiro and Varian 1998).  
The SH literature assumes that users choose only one of the networks. Katz and Shapiro (1985) discuss a single 
period model where a consumer‟s decision to adopt a technology or network depends on the price and the 
rational expectations about the final network size. When new products are introduced, the market may display a 
bias towards existing product, resulting in excess inertia or a rush to the new entrant due to insufficient friction 
(Katz and Shapiro, 1985). In a two-period SH model of dynamic competition with new adopters entering the 
market, Farrell and Shapiro (1988) show that an inferior product can enter a market where there are economies 
of scale and switching cost for consumers. However, they note that it will be difficult for such a new entrant to 
lure the installed base, and that it may be more successful in attracting new adopters. Beggs and Klemperer 
(1992) propose an infinite period model where new consumers arrive in the market every period and a fraction of 
old consumers leaves. Switching costs make the market more attractive to a new entrant in spite of an installed 
base. Farrell & Saloner (1985) model sequential decisions to completely adopt one amongst multiple platforms 
(i.e., single homing) where the timing of adoption is endogenous. However, in our model, the participants 
sequentially decide on the extent of adoption of the incumbent and the new entrant in a multi-homing context.  
Another relevant stream of literature involves the diffusion of innovation. Diffusion is a process of 
communicating ideas about an innovation amongst users who are potential adopters (Rogers, 1962). Rogers 
proposed that the adoption curve follows a normal distribution. He classified adopters into innovators, early 
adopters, early majority, late majority and laggards. Bass (1963, 1969) presented an analytical model describing 
this phenomenon, popularly known as the 'Bass diffusion model', which is a special case of the Gompertz 
distribution. The Bass diffusion model considers the adoption of new innovations as a result of interactions 
between existing user base and potential adopters. In this model, the rate of change of adoption depends on the 
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cumulative adopters at a given time, the 'coefficient of external influence' and the 'coefficient of internal 
influence'. The model aids practitioners in predicting sales based on historic information or derived from 
analogous product sales in the past. However, in the Bass model, the adoption pattern is exogenously specified, 
whereas we treat the adoption process as endogenous. The Bass diffusion model does not explicitly specify if new 
adopters enter the market. Thus it is not clear if the adopters are leaving a product to adopt one whose diffusion 
pattern is being predicted. In our model, there are no new adopters in order to isolate the dynamics of network 
effects and technological capabilities and their impact on diffusion. Thus, in our work, users have to leave the 
existing product either completely (in SH) or partially (in MH) to adopt the new entrant‟s offering. 
 
3. The Model 
We consider an incumbent (network 1) with technological capability 1c . A new entrant (network 2) arrives with 
better capability denoted by 2c (     ). The capability of a network may depend on the features provided by 
specific technologies. For instance, suppose the incumbent and the new entrant networks serve gaming and 
music applications only, such that             and            , where          is an increasing function in 
   and   , the features provided by the music and the gaming application respectively in network i. We consider 
the case where each network is superior in one dimension than the other network, although network 2 is 
superior from an overall standpoint 3. For example, MySpace is considered to be superior to Facebook in 
entertainment oriented social networking. Therefore, many users with inclination towards the capability offered 
by MySpace may split their time between MySpace and Facebook, and not completely migrate to the latter.  
As noted earlier, networks offer benefits in the form of technological capability and network effects. We also 
assume that each user is in all other users‟ contact lists. User i  on network 1 has a benefit function given by
1( , , , )i i i iB c t   where c  is the capability of the network, it is the amount of time spent by user i  on the network 
in period  , and 1iζ  is the total time spent by all users (excluding user i) on the network 1 in period  4. While 
some users perceive higher benefits from capabilities than others, the latter may have higher benefits from 
network effects. This is reflected in the user type:             , where    and    are the capability and network 
effects coefficients respectively, and where          denotes the importance that users assign to their own time. 
In this model, all users are assumed to have the same  . Also since   is a user characteristic, it does not change 
across the incumbent and the new entrant. We assume 0 1,i  0 1,  0 1i  and 1i i   . A user with higher 
capability coefficient perceives higher benefits from the capability of a network, while those with higher network 
effects coefficient perceive higher benefits from network effects. User i  will allocate time between the two 
networks such that the net benefit is maximized. The total benefit for user i in a given period is given by
   1 1 1 2 2 2(.) , ,i i i i i i i i iB = B c ,t ,ζ +B c ,t ,ζ   , where 1it and 2it are the times spent by i on network 1 and 2 
respectively, and where 1i  and 2i  are the total times spent by all other users in network 1 and 2 respectively.   
3.1 Model assumptions                                                                       
The diffusion of information about the new entrant (network 2) to users in network 1 occurs at a rate R, such that 
in each period5, R users of the same type receive the information about the new entrant for the first time6. Thus 
all users do not make a simultaneous decision to allocate time to the new network. Rather, the flow of 
information about the new network is such that more capability affine users make a first-time decision regarding 
migration before more network effect affine users. This is a plausible assumption because usually early adopters 
are attracted to a new network because of its capabilities, while late adopters generally tend to place a higher 
                                                          
3 If the new network’s gaming and music technology capabilities are both better than that of the incumbent, i.e., if    
  and       then a user would have no reason to spend time on the incumbent network from a capability standpoint. 
4 This benefit is for period   only, and will change from period to period; however, in this section of the paper we consider 
myopic, period-by-period optimization, and hence omit   from the benefit function for compactness of notation.  
5 A period is a sampling interval in time space. 
6 This simple diffusion pattern is assumed for modeling simplicity. Later in the paper, we use the well-known Rogers curve 
in numerical examples to model the diffusion of information among users in the incumbent network.  
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value on interactions with contacts. Later we also analyze the adoption patterns when information diffuses in the 
opposite direction.  
 
For analytical tractability in a temporal framework, all users are assumed to make myopic decisions (Sobel 1981, 
Farrell and Shapiro, 1988; Beggs and Klemperer,1992) to allocate time to the new network, i.e., they perform 
period-by-period optimization. However, even if the users consider all future periods in choosing the time 
allocation to the new network in a particular period, they would not choose to spend less time on the new 
network than in the case of myopic decision making; with full and accurate information about the network 
capabilities and user types, in a given period, no user will reduce the time allocated to the new network below 
that in an earlier period. However, users may allocate more time to the new network relative to the myopic levels, 
since they know that by spending more time in a given period on the new entrant, they can induce others to 
follow suit in future periods because of network effects. Thus, our results regarding the vulnerability of the 
incumbent are likely to hold even when users make globally optimal decisions.  
 
Katz and Shapiro (1985) consider the case of single-homing in a single-period model with rational expectations. 
In our multi-period model, even if users form rational expectations about the final states of the two networks, 
they may not alter their current period allocation because the diffusion of information about the new entrant is 
such that not all users are informed of the new network until the last period. This is true regardless of whether 
the diffusion pattern follows the Rogers curve or the forms we use in the model (e.g., uniform for homogeneous 
users). Thus even if the new entrant is expected to capture the entire market in period N, in a period p < N, p 
informed users will not allocate the full time T to the new network because in this period, they can still get larger 
benefits by splitting their time between the new entrant and the incumbent, since the latter may still have 
sufficient network effects to prevent complete migration in period p. 
 
Initially, the total number of users in network 1 is N such that RP N where P denotes the period in which all 
users in network 1 become aware of network 2. We initially assume 1R  . Later, we relax this assumption and 
show that the results are actually reinforced in the process. In any period, 1 2i it +t =T  for all i, and thus
1 2 ( 1)i iζ +ζ = N T   . The specific form of the benefit function in period  is given as:  
   
In the presence of a new entrant with a superior capability, but which may lag behind the incumbent on one or 
more dimension(s), a user derives value by dividing time between the two networks in a MH network. The 
capability dependent part of the benefit function captures this effect. The benefits of network effects on each 
network increases with the time the user spends on the network and also the total time spent by all other users 
on the network. In the initial periods of migration when the network effect on the new entrant is weak, the 
capability required by the new entrant is high in order to compensate for the loss in a user‟s utility from the 
network effect on the incumbent network. The relatively more capability affine users make a first-time allocation 
decision in the initial periods and are therefore more prone to migration due to this higher capability of the new 
entrant. As the migration continues and network effects build up in the new network, more users with moderate 
affinity to both capability and network benefits make an allocation decision. This represents the bleeding phase, 
where the total time on the new network increases slowly over time. Subsequently, if adequate network effects 
have developed, users with high affinity for network effects making a first-time decision will allocate large 
chunks of time to the new network, potentially resulting in an avalanche.  
We start with the case of homogenous users, who have the same characteristics  , ,i    . For the SH user, 
the decision is whether to adopt the new entrant network completely (by choosing T) or stay with the incumbent. 
We investigate the MH case where a user can allocate less than T to the new network. For analytical tractability, 
we assume that the first user making the decision can increment her time on the new network by either 0 or T/N 
(i.e., small increments for a large user base) in each period. Since the information received about the new entrant 
is reliable, the users have no incentive to reduce their time on the new network in a later period. For users 2, 3, … 
N, we consider two possible cases: (1) User i (i ≠ 1) allocates an increment of T/N in the ith period (the first time 
s/he makes an allocation decision) and later (Table 1), (2) User i (i ≠ 1) allocates iT/N in the ith period (the first 
time s/he makes an allocation decision) and later (Table 2). The logic behind case 2 (which is more plausible) is 
that when users are homogeneous, all informed users in a given period will allocate the same time to the new 
entrant.  
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Table 2: Time allocation in MH by homogeneous users for case 1 
User # Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 . . . . Period N 
User 1 T/N 2T/N 3T/N . . . . T 
User 2 0 T/N 2T/N . . . . (N-1)T/N 
. . . . 0 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . 
User N 0 0 0 0 T/N 
 
 
Table 3: Time allocation in MH by homogeneous users for case 2 
User # Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 . . . . Period N 
User 1 T/N 2T/N 3T/N . . . . T 
User 2 0 2T/N 3T/N . . . . T 
. . . . 0 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . 
User N 0 0 0 0 T 
 
Proposition 1: For homogeneous users, the capability required by the new entrant to initiate migration in a 
SH network is highest in the first period. In a multi-homing network, the corresponding capability is lower in 
both cases 1 and 2. Further, in all periods, the capability required in case 2 is lower than that in case 1.  
Proof: All proofs are provided in the Appendix. 
A numerical example illustrates the implications of Proposition 1. With                          the 
capabilities required of the new network in period 1 for SH and MH (both cases 1 and 2) are shown in Table 4, 
while the capabilities required in each of the N periods (with N users) for the migration to continue are shown in 
Figure 2. With a much smaller capability relative to the SH case, a new entrant in MH can initiate migration 
away from the incumbent. Further, the maximum capability required across all periods in MH occurs later than 
in SH, where the highest capability must be provided upfront. It is also interesting to note that the maximum 
capability requirement in SH is over three times larger than in MH case 2. Figure 3 shows the growth of the new 
entrant network for SH and MH cases.  
 
Table 4: Capabilities required to initiate migration in SH and MH networks 
                            
                        
                         (both 
cases 1 and 2) 
0.9 0.1 5643.7 396.3 
0.5 0.5 50393 3562.7 
0.1 0.9 453140 31960 
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Figure 2: Capability requirements of the new entrant to cause migration in SH and MH 
 
 
Figure 3: Growth of the new entrant network in SH and MH 
As seen in Figure 3, in both SH and MH case 2, complete migration occurs by the last period. However, relative 
to SH, in MH case 2, the total time increases at a slower rate in the initial periods („bleeding of the incumbent‟) 
and a rapid rate in the latter periods. We also note that all users in MH case 1 may not migrate completely in N 
periods. Unless the new entrant provides additional capability improvements at such time, the network may stall 
into a niche platform, whereby both the incumbent and the new entrant share the market between themselves.   
The assumption of increments by T/N is to make the analysis tractable and to demonstrate that small increments 
in time allocation to the new entrant can ultimately lead to large scale migration. Similar results would be 
obtained if we allow users to increment time by xT ,  x  < 1. As x  increases, the highest capability required by 
the new entrant also increases, but remains lower than the highest capability required in SH. Furthermore, this 
highest capability will not be required in the first period. E.g., when 1/100x  , the highest capability required in 
MH case 2 is less than 1/6th the capability required in SH and needs to be delivered only in the eighth period.  It 
should be noted that due to the constraint on increments of T/N (or xT in general), the network effect on the 
new entrant will build slower in later periods than what it would in an unconstrained setup, if x is small. That is, 
in the real world where users can freely allocate time across the two networks, the incumbent may be even more 
vulnerable than that implied by Proposition 1.  
Nault and Vandenbosch (1996) suggest that incumbent firms should “eat their own lunch” by leapfrogging in 
innovation to face competition from a new entrant. Our paper shares the spirit of continuous innovation, but 
suggests how a new entrant may not have to leapfrog in technology; rather, in the MH setting, the new entrant 
can introduce small increments in technology at regular intervals and still manage to gain market share. For 
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example, MySpace and Facebook were launched in 2003 and 2004 respectively with very similar social 
networking tools like the ability to add friends by searching existing profiles, and posting messages and photos. 
Facebook continuously improved the social networking experience by adding capabilities gradually, while 
MySpace began losing its main demographics of teenagers in 2007 due to design and privacy issues7. While 
Facebook incrementally added features like Share, News Feeds, Mini-Feed, Marketplace, Translation tools, 
Facebook Chat, Like feature, Virtual Gift Shop, etc., and created a platform for Facebook application developers 
maintaining transparency in design and privacy control, MySpace struggled with its design or privacy related 
issues. Thus, MySpace‟s decline was not a result of a revolutionary technology shift induced by Facebook, but can 
be attributed to the latter‟s gradual but steady stream of improvements. Similarly, Google+ entered the market in 
2011 with a different concept of social networking and is gaining membership rapidly. Google+ is also slowly but 
steadily adding features to its platform. If the incumbent (Facebook) does not innovate continuously, as it has in 
the past, it may slowly lose market share to Google+ in spite of strong network effects.  
 
3.2 Heterogeneous users 
We now analyze the case of heterogeneous users, who have different capability and network effects coefficients. 
As noted in the model development section, with increasing period, the affinity toward capability decreases while 
that toward network effects increases. We assume that in period  , 
1min
max
 

 
 
  , where 1   and min
max


 is 
the ratio of first user‟s characteristics. As  reduces and   increases, the ratio increases from min
max


 in period 1 
to max
min


in period N. For N users, 1max min
min max
N 
 
  , or 
max max
min min
ln
ln
1N
 
 
 
 
  

. For a large user base, this 
assumption implies that adjacent users differ in characteristics by small amounts. A heterogeneous user makes a 
full adoption decision between the incumbent and new entrant in the SH scenario, whereas the choice of 
increment is between o and T/N in the MH setting. In SH with heterogeneous users (represented by H), the 
capability 
2SHc   required of network 2 to ensure migration of an informed user in period  , is given by: 
 22 1 2 1 .SHc c T N
 





    Thus, the period in which
2SHc   reaches a maximum is given by
1 1
.
2 log
S
N


 

 In MH, the capability       required to ensure that an informed user gives an additional 
time T/N in any period   is given by: 
   
   
    
   
2
1 min
2 1
max
1 1 2 1
.
1 1
k
MH k
N k N k N N kT
c c
Nk k k k
  
    
   
   

              
        
 
It is analytically difficult to find the period in which the highest capability is required. Therefore we resort to 
numerical illustrations to show that the peak capability required in SH needs to be delivered before the peak 
capability required for MH, which has implications for the vulnerability of the incumbent.  
                                                          
7 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19717700/ 
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Figure 4: Maximum capability required for heterogeneous users in SH and MH (
1 50, 40, 100, 0.5c T N     ) 
As shown in Figure 4, in the SH network of heterogeneous users, the initial capability required to cause 
migration of the first user is fourteen times higher than that in MH. This observation is encouraging for new 
entrants, for it is more challenging for the new entrant to deliver a large capability upfront than to do so 
gradually. We also note that the highest capability required of the new entrant in SH needs to be delivered earlier 
than in the MH case. Thus we note that a new entrant in MH can take longer to develop and deliver 
improvements in capability compared to the SH case. Of course, the network effect builds faster on the SH 
network due to complete adoption, while MH witnesses a slow increase in network effects because (for analytical 
tractability) we have constrained users to increment their time by 0 or T/N in the MH case. In later periods, the 
SH network is predominantly driven by increasing network effects, while the MH network requires a high 
capability to compensate for the slow rate of increase in network effects. However, the high required capability in 
later periods for MH is an artifact of our constraint of increments in steps of T/N. In the next section we remove 
the constraint on the increment, and show that complete migration can take place with much lower maximum 
capability requirements in MH.  
So far we have assumed that the diffusion of information is such that capability affine users make a decision 
before users with higher affinity for network effects. Next we analyze the case where information diffuses to users 
with higher affinity to network effects before it does for capability affine users. We focus on the difference in 
capabilities required of the new entrant in this reverse diffusion pattern, for the result has implications for 
campaign strategies that the new entrant would use in order to spread information about its network. 
Proposition 2: If the diffusion of information in a SH or MH network takes place such that the user with the 
highest affinity to capability makes the first decision to migrate, the highest capability required by the new 
entrant is lower than the case when the diffusion of information takes place in the reverse direction.  
The new entrant may build capabilities to target network and/or capability affine users to spread information 
about its network. While the capability required to lure network affine users may be high, a relatively lower 
capability may suffice to attract a capability affine user. For example, in an online social network catering to 
music, a capability affine user may be attracted by a technology that can understand her taste in music and 
recommend new songs. However, this may not be sufficient to attract a network affine user, who may need 
additional capabilities to interact and share content with other users. From the new entrant‟s perspective it 
should be easier to reach capability affine users initially by building a superior capability rather than network 
affine users. Thus, the new entrant should devise strategies to enable diffusion of information such that users 
who value capability more than network effects get the information and therefore the opportunity to migrate 
first.   
So far we have assumed that only one user makes a first-time decision per period to migrate or increment time in 
single and MH networks respectively. When multiple users receive information and take a first-time decision to 
initiate migration to the new network, the network effect on the new entrant builds faster than the case when a 
single user makes a migration decision. Thus the capability required by the new entrant to attract multiple 
homogeneous users is less than that required to attract a single homogeneous user.  
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Proposition 3: If diffusion of information occurs in a way such that R (>1) homogeneous users receive the 
information about the new network, the highest capability required (to move the first user) will be lower than 
the case when R=1. This holds true for both S and MH networks. 
3.3 Optimal decisions of heterogeneous users 
In this section we analyze the case where heterogeneous users can choose any increment of time (up to T) to 
spend on the new network. We use nonlinear programming tools in Matlab 7.9 to perform nonlinear 
optimization. The definition of optimality is based on Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, which ensure that 
the gradient is zero at the minima but are modified by the total time constraint. Active Set algorithms are used to 
compute optimal time allocation. The algorithm starts from a feasible point, approximates the solution to the 
problem defined by active constraints, computes a Quasi-Newton approximation of the Hessian of the 
Lagrangian, removes constraints with negative Lagrange multiplier and searches for infeasible constraints in 
order to compute an optimal solution8. 
When users are heterogeneous, the optimal decision is attained by simultaneously solving the first order 
conditions of informed users in the     period. To assess the difference in capabilities required to cause 
migration in single and MH for heterogeneous users without constraints on time increments, we assume that   
lies between 0.2 (low sensitivity to capability) and 0.8 (high sensitivity to capability). Further, 20% of users have 
  uniformly distributed between 0.7 and 0.8 (i.e., these are “innovators and early adopters” of an innovation). 
60% have   uniformly distributed between 0.4 and 0.6 (“early and late majority”). The remaining 20% users 
have   uniformly distributed between 0.2 and 0.3 (“laggards”). This distribution follows a pattern similar to the 
Rogers curve (Rogers 1962). 
Figure 5 shows that with  
  
  
 = 1.6, the SH network stalls in period 20, while the MH network continues to grow 
smoothly. This observation reaffirms the analytical results obtained earlier under constrained choices in the case 
of MH, where users derive more value by dividing their time on the two networks, while in SH users have to 
make a binary decision, thus requiring a revolutionary technology to completely abandon the incumbent.  
Figure 6 shows the migration patterns with the same parameter values as in Figure 5 but with a higher capability 
of the new network (
  
  
 = 2). We observe that due to the higher capability of the new entrant, complete migration 
takes place successfully in SH. As expected, migration is initially slow in the case of MH, but the total time spent 
on the new network catches up to the level of SH in later periods. Only innovators and early adopters may choose 
to migrate to a new entrant when only SH is permitted; however, the same group of users may act as a trigger for 
slow bleeding of the incumbent network in MH. Since the bleeding is slow when users make unconstrained 
optimal decisions, it may go undetected initially or not raise an alarm even when detected. It is critical for the 
incumbent to take corrective action in order to pull back the users migrating away from the incumbent, before 
the avalanche stage is reached. Once the avalanche begins, the demise of the incumbent is inevitable. However, 
there are cases where the incumbent may not be in a position to react to capability improvements by the new 
entrant. For example, MySpace lost a majority of its user base to Facebook, but could not match the capabilities 
being delivered steadily by the latter. Thus, we suggest that the economic moat of network effects is susceptible 
to breach in the case where users do not have to give up on the incumbent in a single period to embrace the new 
entrant. 
 
 
                                                          
8 http://www.mathworks.com/help/toolbox/optim/ 
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Figure 5: Effect of new entrant‟s capability    on total time on the new network in SH and MH.             
       N=100, T=40,      .                     
 
 
Figure 6: Effect of new entrant‟s capability    on total time on new entrant.                    N=100, 
T=40,      .  
To demonstrate how an incremental technological progress may breach the incumbency protection provided by 
network effects, we isolated the model from the incumbent‟s reaction to the new entrant‟s arrival. In the 
following section, we analyze the effect of the incumbent‟s delivery of an improved capability as a reaction to the 
new network‟s superior technology. We also relax the assumption of myopic optimization by the users.  
3.4 Incumbent’s reaction to the new entrant 
We analyze a SH scenario where the incumbent introduces an increased capability after the arrival of the new 
network. We assume that homogenous users use a discount factor δ (     ) to optimize over an infinite time 
horizon. Since users are homogeneous, we only need to analyze the first user‟s decision problem. The sequence of 
events is as follows: In period 1, the new entrant arrives with capability 2c that is sufficient for the first 
homogenous user (and thereafter subsequent users) to migrate to the new entrant completely. Thus, in period 1, 
the first user shall migrate to the new entrant network. However, the incumbent realizes that this will eventually 
result in a large scale migration, and therefore reacts by providing an improved capability 1 1c c  in period 
where1 N  . In the absence of switching costs other than those due to network effects, informed users will 
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migrate to the new entrant until period 1  ; then, depending on 1c  such users may return permanently to the 
incumbent (assuming no further improvements by the new entrant). Therefore, the incumbent foregoes the 
network effects from the informed users until period 1  due to migration to the new network. Thereafter, 
depending upon the level of improvement, all past decision makers who migrated to the new network may return 
to the incumbent, while the remaining users prefer to stay back with the incumbent. Since the users are 
homogeneous, we only consider the first user‟s decision problem to migrate to the new entrant and return upon 
the delivery of improved capability by the incumbent. The condition is given by: 
    
 
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This can be simplified to    2
1
1
1 1 1 .
1
NT
c
    
 
         
  
 
Proposition 4a: As the delivery period increases, the improvement that the incumbent has to deliver to 
reverse the migration also increases. 
Proposition 4b: As the total number of users increases, the period by which the incumbent must deliver the 
improved capability increases. 
Proposition 4c: As the affinity of homogeneous users to capability increases, the period by which the 
incumbent must deliver the improved capability decreases; for a given period of delivery, the incumbent will 
need a lower improvement in capability for users with higher affinity to capability. 
The network effect on the new network becomes progressively stronger over time. The improved capability 
delivered by the incumbent has to overcome the pull created by the network effects developing on the new 
network. Thus, the incumbent should strive to deliver the desired improvement in capability as early as possible. 
Because of the pattern of decision to migrate, an incumbent with a large user base will enjoy a strong network 
effect for a longer period of time. Since the new entrant will take more time to build up stronger network effects, 
the incumbent has the opportunity to deliver an improved capability relatively later. As the affinity to capability 
increases, the user derives more benefit from a given capability level. Thus, the capability improvement required 
to ensure that the user has an incentive to migrate back to the incumbent is lower for a user with higher affinity 
to capability. If the incumbent comes up with an improvement soon enough, then it may cause the reversal of 
migration with a capability lower than that of the new entrant owing to its large user base. The period by which 
the incumbent can deliver a capability lower than the new entrant and still cause reverse migration is given by  
 3 1 2
1
N N

 

   

 
It should be noted that the period of delivery above is independent of user characteristics  , ,i    . 
However, as the users discount the future more, the incumbent needs to provide the improved capability faster.  
In the first part of the paper, we have shown how a new entrant can induce migration with capability smaller 
than the incumbent and slowly develop its capabilities over time to cause a large scale migration if the incumbent 
does not react with innovation. In the latter part we see how the incumbent can combat such a strategy by the 
new entrant and innovate in order to cause a reverse migration. In reality, both the incumbent and the new 
entrant should strive for continuous innovation and not rely only on network effects. The demise of online 
networks like MySpace and ensuing competition between Facebook and Google+ accentuate the importance of 
continuous innovation. 
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4. Conclusions  
 
The “information economy” has been characterized as a setting with strong network effects, and prior research 
has indicated that such forces favor the incumbent and can make it difficult for superior new technologies or 
networks to be adopted. In this study we have noted that in the increasingly common scenario of multi-homing, 
an incumbent may be more vulnerable to a new entrant‟s threats than previously believed in the network effects 
literature. We also demonstrated that in a setting where users may incrementally adopt a new network by 
increasing the level of adoption over time, a new entrant need not provide the maximum technological capability 
at the outset as in the case of single homing; it has the opportunity to arrive with a marginally superior capability 
and to improve such capability over time. In other words, the incumbency protection power of network effects 
appear to be overrated in the modern context of simultaneous and incremental adoption of multiple 
technologies.  
We have also demonstrated that in the absence of switching costs other than network effects, the incumbent can 
regain lost market share by delivering an improved capability before the network effects have built up sufficiently 
on the new entrant‟s network. Further, there is a tradeoff between the required capability improvement and the 
maximum delivery time, which, in turn, depend on the number of users and the affinity of users for technological 
capabilities. These results indicate that network effects may contribute less to the competitive advantage of an 
incumbent than previously believed, and that competitive intensity may increase considerably due to the 
opportunity to compete with a powerful incumbent with just a marginally superior offering followed by 
incremental improvements.     
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Appendix 
Proof of proposition 1   
 In SH, in period 1, the first user will migrate completely if  22 1 1c c T N


   . In period  the 
th user will 
migrate completely to the new entrant if  22 1 2 1c c T N
 

    .  Let this value of c2 (the maximum capability 
that must be provided by the new entrant in period   in the SH case of homogenous users) be denoted by 2Shc   , 
which is decreasing in  , i.e.,  𝑥   𝑆 𝑝     𝑆  .  
For MH cases 1 and 2, every users can increment their time only by 0 or T/N. In period 1, user 1 spends T/N on 
the new entrant while all other users still allocate T each to the incumbent. In order to make this feasible, the 
benefit that user 1 accrues by incrementing the allotment to the new entrant by T/N must be larger than that 
from incrementing by 0. This can be written as: 
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Comparing the maximum capability required for SH network and MH network in case of homogenous users, 
  𝑆           {  ( 
        )}  
 
 
         (      )   , for                      
and         .  Therefore,            . 
 
For MH case 1, for any period  , the capability required to motivate all informed users to increment their time 
on the new entrant by 
T
N
is given by: 
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For MH case 2, in any period  , the capability required to motivate all informed users to allot
T
N

is given by: 
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Proof of proposition 2  
In SH of heterogeneous users, when 
 is decreasing, 
1min
max
 

 
 
  and when 
 is increasing 
min
max
N 

 
 
  . In the case of heterogeneous users (denoted by H), the capability 
2SHc   required to ensure 
migration of a first time decision making user in period  is given by:  22 1 2 1 .SHc c T N
 





    When 
the affinity to capability is decreasing with increasing periods, the period in which the maximum capability needs 
to be delivered by the new entrant is given by 
( )
1 1
2 log
S dec
N


 

where
( )
1 1
2 logmin
2 1
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2
logS dec
N
SHc c




      
 
 . Similarly, when the affinity to capability is increasing with period, the 
minimum capability required is delivered in period 
1 1
2 log
N 


and maximum capability must be delivered in 
the first period itself, i.e., 
( ) 1S inc  where  ( )
1min
2 1
max
1
S inc
N
SHc c N


     and 
( ) ( )2 2S inc S decSH SH
c c  . 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
 
From proposition 1, we know that the capability requirement for the first agent is the highest. Therefore, 
comparing the first agent‟s capability requirements for R = 1 and R > 1 should suffice. 
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In a SH network, when 1R  ,  22 1 1 1Shc c T N


   .  When 1R  , user 1‟s problem is given by, 
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         . This can be simplified to,   22 1ShRc c T N R
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When 1R  , user 1‟s problem is given by, 
     
 
2 1
2
1
1 1 1
1
MhR
T T T T T T
c R c T N T R T
N N N N N N
c T N T
 
   
  
        
                
        
  
 
This can be simplified to      
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Proof of propositions 4a, 4b and 4  
These proofs follow directly from comparative statics.   
 
